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Dust and gas explosions are characterized by damage to property and fatal consequences related to their 
occurrence. Despite laws, regulations, and standards to prevent and mitigate explosions, dust and explosions are 
a recurring event in South African industries. This study aimed at identifying if a gap existed between South African 
local regulations and standards to prevent and mitigate industrial explosions. A comparative literature review was 
done to identify the international best practice regulations and standards. Risk reduction measures presented in 
the hierarchy of loss prevention control such as inherent safety, passive engineered safety, active engineered 
safety, and procedural safety were reviewed to incorporate process safety human factor and company culture as 
additional contributing factors to dust and gas explosions. A survey questionnaire was structured using the 
principles from the hierarchy of loss prevention control and recommended local and international regulations and 
standards. The survey was distributed to professionals and experts in the edible oil industry. 
The responses received show that three knowledge gaps exist within the industry professionals and experts. The 
knowledge gaps are within the following principles of the hierarchy of loss prevention control: (i) Inherent safety - 
respondents showed a lack of awareness and utilization of area classification information. The lack of exposure 
can be attributed to manufacturing companies outsourcing the design of processes and plants and area 
classifications to engineering design and consultancy companies. (ii) Engineered safety - respondents lack 
awareness of the significance of passive barriers that are within their systems. This can result in poor decision-
making when encountering an emergency- as the knowledge of the safer areas of the plants or site is poor within 
respondents. (iii) Process safety management - inconsistent responses were noted with 9 respondents (53%) 
showing confident awareness but 11 respondents (65%) claim to utilize the principles. The 2 respondents showed 
utilization of permit to work issuance procedures but lack awareness of legal liability compliance.  
This knowledge gap within industry professionals can be detrimental – as accidents can occur in areas that 
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1 Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
Industrial dust and gases are common by-products and solvents utilized in the manufacturing of high-end 
products. The poor management and handling of these clouds of dust and gasses can result in explosions causing 
fatalities in the workplace [1], [2]. Employee safety in all industries is an essential aspect of the organizations' 
human resources. The human resources acquired by an organization are crucial in the strategic execution of the 
organization's profit-driven strategy [3]. Employees in the manufacturing, chemical, petrochemical, and mining 
industries are continuously exposed to different types of hazards. The hazards presented by the process itself – 
if operated incorrectly it can cause harm to the organization and its community [3]. The occurrence of an accident 
can result in a guilty violation of South African labor laws. If an organization violates South African labor law, it 
can result in civil claims (in case of death), medical claims (in case of injury) which can consequently lead to loss 
of productivity, low morale, and efficiency [3]. Although organizations implement principles of the hierarchy of loss 
prevention control such as - hazard elimination, hazard substitution, engineered safety approach, procedural and 
administrative, as well as safety standards and regulations outlining how work is to be executed – accidents are 
impossible to fully eradicate in totality. Hence, Van Den Honert [3], found that human behavior is the biggest 
concerning variable in the accidents reported by organizations as humans are subject to work-place stress thus 
resulting in 60 to 80 percent of all workplace accidents [3]. However, caution should be taken to highlight that both 
employer and employee fall within the category of human behavior [3]. Organizations are continuously tasked to 
implement and maintain occupational health and safety regulations and standards to mitigate the risks to which 
their employees are exposed [3]. Van Den Honert [3], notes that organizations are required to decide whether a 
risk is acceptable or whether further prevention approaches are required to mitigate the hazard. However, as 
much as each process consists of various safety complexities, human behavior continues to be a common cause 
of most accidents. This occurs when risks cannot be mitigated to As-Low-As-Reasonably-Possible (ALARP), then 
employers (organization) rely on the expertise of a Health & Safety (H&S) Officer to suggest additional 
recommendations and accept the risk is ALARP [3].  
 
South African Department of Labour (DOL) 
 
The South African department of labor (SA DOL), is tasked with the mission to regulate the South African labor 
market, through the implementation of appropriate legislation and regulations, inspections, and enforcing of 
compliance, by also promoting equity, social and income protection, and protection of human rights [4], [5]. SA 
DOL develops basic working conditions, occupational health, and safety regulations. It further handles the 
deployment of occupational health and safety standards, which includes the Compensation for Occupational 
Injuries and Diseases Act No 130 of 1993 (COIDA). It assists with compensation to employees who are medically 
declared disabled as a result of an occupational injury or diseases contracted in the course of employment, or for 
death resulting from the sustained injuries or diseases [6]. The compensation fund is obliged to report on the 






South African Occupational Statistics 
 
Occupational fatalities and injuries are common within workplaces that do not have occupational health and safety 
systems in place. Moreover, organizations that only perform the bare minimum of standards and regulations 
implementation continuously place employees' lives at risk. During the year 2018, approximately 184,424 
organizations were inspected [5]. It was found that 32,289 organizations were not compliant with SA labor laws 
[5]. During the same year, a total of 144,540 non-fatal workplace injuries and 348 fatal workplace accidents were 
reported [5]. Table 1, below represents the fatal and non-fatal accidents and incidents which occurred within the 
South African workplace within 4 years between 2014 and 2018 [5]. During this period approximately 500,000 
incidents were reported with the compensation fund. 
 
Table 1: South African Occupational injuries  2014 - 2018 
Year Fatal Non-Fatal Total 
 Number % Number %  
2014 116 0.2% 68,494 99.8% 68,610 
2015 90 0.3% 26,628 99.7% 26,718 
2016 134 0.4% 37,581 99.6% 37,715 
2017 506 0.3% 155,470 99.7% 155,976 
2018 348 0.2% 144,540 99.8% 144,888 




During the period 2014 to 2018 occupational accidents which resulted in fatalities were approximately 1,194 [5]. 
Sixteen fatalities resulted from industrial explosions and 13 employees were injured during an explosion accident 
[7][8][9]–[12]. The SA DOL annual statistic report does not categorize occupational fatalities based on cause 
hence the data of fatalities from explosions were retrieved from newspaper articles [7][8][9]–[12]. 
Dust and gas explosions vary due to the physical state of the matter – solid compared to gaseous. Particle size 
is therefore critical in the prevention of dust explosions [13]. The differences in their explosion regimes are, gas 
explosion involves a homogeneous system where fuel and air are separated by molecular distances [1], therefore 
encouraging thorough mixing of the fuel and oxidant without effects of gravity [14]–[16]. However, dust/air mixtures 
are heavily influenced by gravity and the dust explosion requires a dust/oxidant suspension [17]. Dust is generated 
in different forms and concentrations in various production environments including grain and food plants; textile 
manufacturing; electrical power generation; metal production; mining; plastic production and; chemical process 
industries. Explosible solvents are used in processing plants to extract and in other industries, explosible gases 
are by-products in the processing plants. These two products if not correctly handled, vented, or stored can result 
in explosions. 
Dust and gas explosions occur suddenly due to a completion of a fire triangle requirements which requires oxygen, 
a fuel source (dust or gas), and an ignition source for an explosion to occur (fire triangle, Figure 1a) [1]. Amyotte 




confinement of dust particles, to create the explosion pentagon (Figure 1b) [13]. Furthermore, Garcia-Agreda 
[18], modified the explosion pentagon (explosion pentagon Figure 1c) to include the explosion requirements for 
a hybrid or dust explosion which include combustible fuels (dust or gas) existing simultaneously or independently 
[18].  
Explosions can be categorized into two: primary and secondary explosions. Primary explosions usually occur 
inside the confines of equipment, i.e. process vessels (tanks, extractors, distillation columns), grinders, mills, and 
dryers [17], [19]. The explosion is caused by the satisfaction of the explosion triangle/pentagon. A primary 
explosion is deemed primary if it results in a secondary explosion externally to the process vessels. Secondary 
explosions are initiated by blast waves arising from primary explosions. According to South African National 
Standards (SANS) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards – all hazardous areas which 
consist of explosible atmospheres should be zoned according to the relevant standards. Also, areas potentially 
explosible are required to be independently isolated and ventilated as per International and local regulations and 
standards [20].  
  
 
Figure 1: Fire Triangle (a), Explosion Pentagon (b), modified Explosion Pentagon (c) [18]. 
 
Local and International Standards 
 
Local South African standards are published by the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) which was 
founded in September 1945. SABS is a body established by the Standards Act (Act No. 24 of 1945) to be the 
national standardization institution. Its mandate is to develop and maintain South African National Standards 
(SANS) [21]. A “standard” defines the specification required for an equipment or process of equipment 




[21], [22]. SABS is a founding member of the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) The South 
African Bureau of Standards is associated with the following Regional and International Standard Bodies: 
 
International: 
IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE - Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers 
ISO - International Organization for Standardization 
ASTM - American Society for Testing and Materials 
WSSN - World Standards Services Network 
Regional: 
CEN - European Committee for Standardization 
CENELEC - European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization 
UN/ECE - UN Economic Commission for Europe 
SADCSTAN - Southern African Development 
Community Cooperation in Standardization 
 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60079 series 
 
This study is focused on the IEC 60079 series which is a series of standards that adopted the European 
Atmosphere Explosible (ATEX) directives which were published in 1994 and 1999. The two ATEX directives - 
Directive 94/9/EC and Directive 99/92/EC were published by the European Union Parliament [23]. Directive 
94/9/EC deals with equipment and safety protection systems intended for use in explosible atmospheric areas 
[23]. Explosible areas are categorized as explosible zones in terms of fuel sources (dust or gas). The zones are 
categorized based on the condition of the explosible atmosphere, where condition refers to the amount of 
exposure to an explosible fuel source (dust or gas) [14], [23], [24]. Zoning is based on three categories: 
continuously present (zone 0/20); likely to occur in normal operation occasionally (zone 1/21) and not likely to 
occur in normal operation and for very short durations (zone 2/22) [14], [23]. The second directive, Directive 
99/92/EC recommends the requirements an organization (employer) is required to adopt to prevent uncontrollable 
release and formation of explosive atmospheres; prevention of ignition and mitigation of explosion effects [23].  
Amyotte and Eckhoff. [1] suggest three ways prevent industrial loss: (i) inherent safety, (ii) engineered safety 
(passive and active), and (iii) procedural safety. Engineered safety involves the installation of safety devices in 
areas that are prone to incidents. These devices can either suppress the impact of the explosion or can detect 
the leakage and alert operators of the deviation in the process. Procedural safety is also known as administrative 
controls, which focuses on implementing safe working procedures, culture and controls to reduce the risk of an 
explosion. The two abovementioned safety controls are reactive and require additional controls and checks from 
the process team and health and safety team. Inherent safety seeks to eliminate the hazard or reduce the hazard 
to its minimal impact, rather than trying to prevent occurrence or mitigating effects. It analyses the properties of a 






1.2 Problem statement 
There exists a knowledge gap between international best practices to prevent and mitigate dust and gas 
explosions and the South African local explosion regulations. 
 
1.3 Research questions 
1. What are the prevention and mitigation approaches to dust and gas explosions? 
2. What are the gaps that exist between global and local standards on explosion prevention?  
 
1.4 Research objectives 
This research seeks to identify and establish the existing gaps between South African local standards and 
international best practices on the causes, prevention, and mitigation of dust and gas explosions. 
1.5 Research rationale 
The South African manufacturing and processing sector have experienced several incidents over the past five 
years (2014 -2019) where lives were lost, and companies had to cease operations due to unanticipated incidents 
which resulted in losses. South African industry professionals and experts may be able to enforce best practices 
to create safe working environments. 
 
1.6 Research design 
This research was approached through an analytical review of literature on prevention and mitigation approaches 
and standards. A survey was designed using the principles on the hierarchy of loss prevention. It was distributed 
to participants to determine the awareness level and utilization rate of best practice explosion prevention 
approaches and standards by industry professionals responsible for health and safety. This was compared to best 
practices from the literature review to aid in identifying the knowledge gaps. 
 
The research evidence required is: 
▪ Best practice guidelines for prevention and mitigation and implementation thereof 





1.7 Research layout 
Table 2: Research Layout 
Chapter Contents 
Chapter 1 – Problem Definition 
Definition of the problem and the impact of 
explosions on the working environment. 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
A detailed review of the causes, 
prevention, and mitigation of explosions 
locally and internationally. 
Chapter 3 – Research Methodology Selection of best-suited research method. 
Chapter 4 – Data Collection and Analysis 
Data analysis of data collection and 
deduction of results. 
Chapter 5 – Conclusion & Recommendations 
Conclusion on results and suggestions on 
the way forward. 
 
1.8 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter defined the problem that exists in South Africa, of explosions occurring in the manufacturing and 
processing industries. These explosions repeatedly occur due to the organizations’ lack of implementation of 
international best practice guidelines for prevention and mitigation. It can be noted that not all processing 
environments can inherently remove the hazard from the working environment but the hazard can be reduced or 
minimized to manageable levels. Hence the need for comparison of South African regulations against the 






2 Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explored the literature of prevention and mitigation of dust and gas explosion by exploring the 
principles of hierarchy of loss prevention control. To decide which approaches were suitable for the prevention of 
dust and gas explosions, an understanding of the commonalities and dissimilarities between dust and gas 
explosion was imperative. Moreover, it was imperative to differentiate between primary and secondary explosions 
as prevention of the primary explosion or reduction of the severity of the primary (lack thereof secondary) 
explosion is imperative in industrial loss prevention control. By understanding the differences and similarities 
within explosions; prevention approaches and recommended standards, current challenges in the industry were 
understood. Therefore, identifying the knowledge gaps between the global and local standards within the South 
African industrial environment 
2.2 Types of Explosion 
An explosion caused by dust clouds and gas mixtures exhibits similar ignition and combustion profiles and can 
be understood by a simple diagram of the fuel-air explosion triangle (Figure 2). The fuel-air explosion triangle 
indicates the necessary conditions for an explosion to occur which are fuel source; oxygen and a source of ignition 
[16], [25]. 
 
Figure 2: Explosion triangle(CSB, 2006) 
When dust or dust-gas (hybrid) mixture explodes it requires that dust is suspended (dispersed) and confined as 
represented by the explosion pentagon in Figure 3. The dust or dust-gas burns rapidly, the fast-burning flame 
within confinement results in an over-pressurized system thus increasing the rate of the burning dust flame 
resulting in a dust explosion. Dust clouds even in partial confinement, if ignited can cause an explosion. Dust and 
gas explosions are catastrophic because if the source area of the explosion is not protected sufficiently it can 
cascade into multiple explosions [1], [17], [25].  
 




Various authors [1], [17], [25], [26] confirmed that dust and gas explosion occur in production environments 
including grain and food processing plants; textile manufacturing; electrical power generation; metal production; 
mining; plastic production, and chemical process industries (Figure 4). However, explosions in the following 
industries (food products, chemical processing, primary metals, and lumber and wood products) accounted for 
nearly 60% of explosions between the period 1985-2005. Moreover; equipment that was most likely to be involved 
in the explosions are:  
1. Grinders and mills which are subjected to friction can result in sparks, dryers that are subjected to 
smoldering which can result in a fire [1]. 
2. Extractors and distillation columns that are subjected to overpressure and pump friction result in sparks 
[16]. 
3. Cyclones and dust collectors keep dust in suspension generating explosible clouds of dust [16]. 
 
 
Figure 4: Industrial Explosions (1985 -2005)(CSB, 2006) 
 
Depending on the severity and process equipment layout [15], an initial explosion can cascade into additional 
explosions [19]. Hence explosions are categorized into two; primary and secondary explosions. A primary 
explosion is deemed primary if it results in a secondary explosion externally to the process vessels [17]. The 
external explosion can be caused when dust leaks into the atmosphere and settles on flat surfaces (steel structure 
beams, cable trays, and other unreachable areas) [25]. When an explosion occurs (Figure 5), it disturbs the 
























Figure 5: Secondary explosion (CSB, 2006) 
2.3 Explosion condition requirements 
Dust Explosion 
 
A dust explosion occurs when the minimum explosible concentration (MEC) is met [13], [17], [27]. MEC is defined 
as the smallest concentration of dust in suspension, that can initiate an explosion [28]. Dust is a different source 
of fuel, unlike gas, it requires a presence of dust suspension (aeration of dust) and confinement (dust cloud 




Gas explosions are defined as rapid reactions where the explosible and oxygen exist within the lower flammable 
limit (LFL) and upper flammable limit (UFL) [1] and are subject to sources of ignition [19]. The ignition sources 
generally considered are both thermal or electrostatic sources [26]. However, gas explosions can occur without 
the presence of an ignition source [16]. Over pressurizing has resulted in a significant amount of gas explosions. 
It occurs when rapid chemical reaction run(a)way resulting in the production of gases, leading to pressure build-




Hybrid Explosion  
 
The methane gas/coal-dust hybrid combination is the most renowned hybrid combination which exists in 
underground coal mining [18], [31]. It consists of an explosible gas and explosible dust, which may be present in 
the lower flammable limit (LFL) and minimum explosible concentration (MEC) respectively, and present an 
explosible mixture [1]. Table 3, below shows the different explosion conditions required. These explosions are 
most likely to result in domino effects due to the presence of two different substances (explosion waves agitate 
settled dust and dust cloud ignites vigorously) [17]. To reduce domino effects which results in catastrophic 
damages, passive barriers; suppression systems; detectors; venting ducts are some available options to mitigate 
the impact of an explosion [1], [17], [32]. 
 
Table 3: Explosion condition comparison. 
 
2.4 Prevention and mitigation approaches to dust and gas explosion 
When designing a process, which consists of a dust or gas hazard, it is useful to employ a prevention and 
mitigation framework for making the appropriate decision [17], [18], [33]. Amyotte and Eckhoff [1], state, that 
industrial loss prevention control is achieved in three ways: (a) inherent safety, (b) engineered safety (active to 
passive), and (c) procedural safety. In this study, procedural safety is explored further and linked to safety 
management systems. Moreover, a fourth prevention and mitigation approach explored is the human factor 
(focusing on the role of management and co-workers) and the company culture. Figure 6, illustrates the generally 
accepted systematic hierarchy of control approach to loss prevention in the industry. When considering this 
approach, the risk reduction measure (from most effective to least) is inherent, passive engineered, active 
engineered, and procedural safety management [1]. The current study extended the focus to the impact of human 
factor and the company culture as the next step to achieving effective loss prevention. Figure 9, demonstrates 
the addition of process safety management system (PSM) and human culture and how it reduces the residual risk 
through maintaining and updating the live PSM documents that the company should continuously update when 





Explosion Conditions Requirement 
  Oxygen Fuel Ignition Dispersion Confinement MEC LFL 
Dust Solid 












2.4.1 Inherent safety approach 
The theory of inherent safety was first proposed by Trevor Kletz [1], [15]. He was among the first to recognize that 
any action is taken towards removing or substituting a hazard (designing to minimize the hazard) resulted in a 
safer working environment, he focused on topics such as inherent safety, hazard identification, incident 
investigation, and documenting lessons learned [1], [15]. Inherent safety is defined as a proactive risk 
management approach in the plant design phase and layout definition, its purpose is to remove the hazard at the 
source as compared to accepting the hazard and resorting to finding solutions to prevent the occurrence of the 
hazard [1]. To achieve the greatest impact, inherent safety uses the properties of a material or properties of the 
process to eliminate or reduce the hazard, in its earliest stage (design stage) of the project life cycle [15]. To fully 
apply the inherent safety approach in the design phase, guide words are considered, these guidewords assist 
with determining the appropriate approach for primary explosion prevention, domino effect prevention, and 
explosion severity mitigation. 
 
Cozzani, Tugnoli, and Salzano [15] identifies, the cause of primary explosions as equipment product inventory 
and suggests the baseline focus areas using intensification and moderation as a guide word. Inherent safety can 
be achieved by: 
• reduction of inventory in a single equipment 
• safer storage conditions, such as underground storage tanks with bonding. 
• moderation by using less hazardous conditions, lower process temperatures, and operating pressures.  
The four guidewords are intensification/minimization, substitution, moderation/ limitation, and simplification of 
effects. Table 4, shows examples of the application of the four guidewords in dust and gas explosions prevention 










Table 4: Inherent safety principles 
Principle Description Applications 
Intensification/ 
Minimization 
- Use small amounts of the hazardous material, when 
the handling of the material cannot be avoided 
- Increase equipment efficiency – whilst 
reducing operating capacity (work-in-
progress) 
Substitution - If possible substitute the hazardous material with one 
that is less hazardous  
- Substitute the hazardous process with one that does 
not involve hazardous material. 




- Use hazardous material in their least hazardous 
forms: 
- Moderate operating conditions to those that involve 
less severe operating conditions. 
-Accepting negative effects can arise but focusing on 
limiting effects. 
-Design process with lower operating 
conditions (temperature and pressure) 
-Limiting negative effects to As Low As 
Reasonably Possible (ALARP) 
Simplification - Design processes and equipment to eliminate 
opportunities for human errors (automation) or reactive 
response requirements. 
- Identifying solutions to eliminate excessive use of 
engineered safety features and protective devices 
- Hazard awareness 
- Staff training 
- Procedural safety and upholding of 
safety culture 
-Role of management 
 
An inherent safety approach can be conducted in conjunction with a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study. 
Guidewords are used in HAZOP study to individually assess hazards potentially posed by flow, temperature, 
pressure, and reactivity [34]. During the layout description phase, focus (key) words that can be used are primary 
explosion, escalation explosion, and domino explosion [15]. The blast wave regimes of a primary explosion are 
fundamentally important in developing a process or plant layout which is inherently safe to reduce the severity of 
a primary explosion [15]. By using the process of the plant itself as barriers to protect people or emergency 
systems from the hazard [15]. Inherent safety approach is not a standalone approach for prevention and 
mitigation, it works in correlation with engineered approaches, such as the passive engineered approach being 
the next prevention approach as it requires little to no activation [1], [13], [17], [26]. 
 
2.4.2 Passive engineered safety 
Passive engineered devices are systems that are regarded as the last line of defense in an explosion prevention 
hierarchy of loss prevention control. This is because these devices have no intended function if an explosion 
doesn’t occur [15]. Their function is determined by the physical effect of the explosions, deflagration into 
detonation (DDT) transition [35], [36]. However, passive engineered safety is considered immediately after the 
inherent safety approach, as it assists with the process or plant layout description, where segregation and 





The design of passive explosion barrier systems has remained similar for several years; these devices are widely 
used for explosion suppression in the coal mines, with intention of reducing the consequences of an accident [17], 
[36]. The mechanism used in the underground mines involves the utilization of the kinetic energy in the pressure 
wave ahead of the explosion, to overturn pre-installed passive barriers dispersing inert material and forming a 
cloud of non-explosible material (Figure 7) [37].  
There are two widely used passive barriers in the mining industry and chemical industry and they are stone dust 
barriers, which have been in use since 1920, and water barriers [38]. Stone dust barriers are deemed not reliable 
because they cake up (solidifies) easily under humid atmospheres and during the explosion the trajectory of the 
dispersion of the inert dust is not always guaranteed, thus reducing effectiveness [38]. Water barriers are more 
superior to stone dust barriers as they are easy to maintain and less expensive, advantages of water barriers are 
the ability to decrease the concentration of the dust and increases the humidity of the dust [38]. Moreover, the 
water can disperse into the path of the flame, thus reducing domino effects and escalation [38]. 
 
 
Figure 7: Passive barriers in coal mining shafts. a) Pre-explosion (b) Post explosion (Wang et al., 2017) 
 
Another type of passive device is venting systems, which work passively by relieving explosible pressure clouds 
that may have accumulated in a specific closed space [39], [40]. In mines and petrochemical industries flames 
are purposefully vented [40]. If the flue stack or vent line condition is not maintained (cleaned), it can reduce in 
diameter and impact the venting efficiency leading to an over-pressurized explosion [39], [40]. Nonetheless, new 
technology has been developed which can be retrofitted in current applications. It is known as a flameless venting 
flame arrestor; it permits gas flow but prevents flame transmission [41].  
Other forms of passive barriers are in a form of wall suppression systems, where a wall is built to create a 
separation in the zones [19]. A fluid known as aerogel is used to ensure a room or a wall is leak-proof, the aerogel 
is applied in-between the wall gaps and bricks to increase compression thus sealing the doors and windows [42]. 
The construction of walls destroys the flame propagation movement and absorbs kinetic energy [35]. The 
propagation of an acoustic wave is moderated in both amplitude and velocity because of the good compression 





2.4.3 Active engineered safety 
Active engineered devices possess more advantages than passive engineered devices [1]. The most prominent 
is one of detection and alerting, which is used to control the concentration of dust (MEC) or fuel/gas (LFL/UFL) in 
an atmosphere and ensure that it’s below explosible ranges [1], [17]–[19], [32]. They also reduce the concentration 
of oxygen in the atmosphere by the addition of inerting gasses such as carbon dioxide; nitrogen; argon and helium 
[17], [35]. When an explosion occurs they detect the projection of the explosion flame and inject an inert gas or 
suppressants [17], [35]. Active engineered devices can be designed based on their level of sensitivity, low 
sensitivity sensors may cause the suppression method to fail and high sensitivity can cause unnecessary financial 
loss [16]. Active engineered barriers consist of sensors; dispensers and suppressants [17]. 
 
 
Figure 8: Active inert suppressant agent discharged in the ducting. 
 
Sensors when strategically positioned (Figure 8), detect an oncoming explosion by detecting an increase in the 
following parameters: static pressure; temperature, and radiation [35]. 
The types of sensors used are thermocouples; thermo-mechanical; ultraviolet; infrared or blast operated sensors 
[35]. Upon sensing/ detecting the explosion flame or wave, the dispenser is activated [35]. 
1. Dispensers discharge inert gas or water utilizing compressed gas or a water deluge spray system. Spray 
nozzles can be strategically positioned across the operating atmosphere, these nozzles based on their 
sizes can dispense suppressants uniformly across the operating atmosphere area [38].  
2. Suppressants are required to match the physical and chemical properties of explosible materials; the 
suppression efficiency of an active system depends on two core control philosophies: short-time-delay 
and strong reliability [17], [35]. Other factors that are essential to the success of suppressants are the 
type of extinguisher materials; triggering pressure; the geometry of the protected area; uniform dispersion 





2.4.4 Limitations of active engineered safety 
Zou and Panawalage [38], complimented active engineered barriers as the most advantageous preventative 
option compared to passive barriers. Though, its dependency on electronic control components may create an 
unsafe condition [38]. For example, if a power outage causes a chemical process reaction runaway or equipment 
overpressurizing –the unavailability of the active engineered barriers, can result in escalation or domino effect 
[15]. In the mining industry due to their processing areas being in remote areas, external power sources on the 
surface of the mine might not be readily available, thus compromising the effectiveness of the active barriers [35], 
[38]. Moreover, Amyotte and Eckhof [1], stated that these active engineered devices require proper maintenance 
and testing to facilitate their reliable performance and to ensure continuous operation. Zou and Panawalage [38], 
recommend that uninterrupted power supply (UPS) systems are used as they are battery operated and can give 
the response when required regardless of a power outage or not. 
Furthermore, Wang et al [35] [42], compare passive engineered devices to active engineered devices and suggest 
that active engineered devices are in practicality inferior compared to passive engineered devices as they are 
more complex (internal connections) and have a dependency on control systems. A failure in the system is directly 
related to a failure of the active engineered device [15]. Thus, to ensure that all active engineered devices are 
fully operational, the end-user needs to ensure that procedures are put in place to maintain and safely operate 
these devices/ barriers [1], [26]. 
 
2.4.5 Procedural safety management 
Amyotte and Eckhof [1] suggest, that it is agreed that procedural safety management systems rely on a strong 
human element during the operations of the process or plant. Procedural safety management is placed at the 
bottom of Figure 6 of the hierarchy of loss prevention control, due to the high potential for human error [1]. Hence, 
the performance of the plant personnel is critical to the success and the safety of the operating atmosphere. Plant 
personnel should fully comprehend that they are the last line of explosion prevention and mitigation (to monitor 
anomalies and correct) and simultaneously they are the first-line cause of dust and gas explosion [1], [17]. 
To reduce the risk of an explosion for a dust and gas process, procedural safety measures to be put in place can 
be: 
• Removing ignition sources – by preventing any hot work by grinder, drill, or welding.  
• Removing static source – ensuring building and equipment are bonded and ground to earth. Personal 
protective equipment (PPE) to be anti-static and static eliminator bar to be installed 
• Tools equipment – using the correct tools with anti-spark properties – tools made from copper-beryllium. 
• Removing fuel source – if any hot work or unsafe acts are to be carried out – removal of fuel source (dust 
or gas) is of high significance.  
• Standard operating procedure – compiling of a procedure on how tasks are to be carried out and training 
relevant personnel on the procedure. 
• Job-specific assessment – all risks are analyzed and mitigating solutions are suggested and method 





2.4.6 Process safety management (PSM) 
Safety management systems are methods used for risk management. Process Safety Management systems 
typically consist of approximately 10 pillars, that must be fully assessed and complied with to manage the risks 
As-Low-As-Reasonably-Possible (ALARP) [1], [44]. An organization is required to understand the full extent of 
risks associated with their process/ plant, once a handover is done from the projects team to the operations team 
[17]. It is imperative to understand that once the process/plant construction handover is done, a process risk is 
accepted and will remain until the process/plant is decommissioned [45].  
The objective of PSM is to apply safety management principles to identify, understand and control process/ plant 
hazards. To mitigate the exacerbation of the impact if an incident were to occur [45], [46]. The PSM pillars are:  
• Legal Compliance and accountability 
• Process Documentation, and Design procedures & standards 
• Process risk management and Process and equipment integrity 
• Management of Change 
• Human factors (training and performance monitoring), Enhancement of process safety knowledge 
• Company standards, codes, and regulations 
• Incident investigation and Audits and corrective action 
The abovementioned pillars are merged into Figure 6 – recommended by Amyotte and Eckhoff [1], to create 









2.4.7 Human culture (Management and Co-workers) factor 
Chen, Qi, and Feng [47] investigated Chinese coal mining incidents which occurred between 1980 and 2000, and 
the cause of accidents was human-influenced or human behaviors. These human behaviors are negligence, 
unprofessional conduct, and faulty process/ plant design and accounted for 96% of all Chinese coal mining 
accidents [47]. Some of the causes were: 
• Deliberate violations behaviors that violated the safety systems, i.e. regulations, procedures, etc. Some 
of the most common ones were: smoking, blasting, or welding without checking gas concentration in the 
atmosphere. 
• Mismanagement was due to management decisions, unsafe production processes, and venting. Such as 
performing hot work during production, fixing live damaged cables, unauthorized ventilation of explosible 
gases.  
• The faulty design caused accidents when safety loops were not fully tested and verified during the 
process/ plant commissioning phase. 
To achieve a higher safety standard, the management team should develop a culture that facilitates safety 
consciousness [26].  
 
 
Figure 10: Human factor and safety culture relationship 
 
Figure 10, shows the relationship between the human factor impacts and safety culture. This culture is created 
by management and championed by the co-workers who do the actual work on the ground/ shop floor [26], [34]. 
Amyotte and Eckhoff [1], recommended three concepts that can improve a company’s health & safety policy, (a) 




were sub-divided into subcultures: (a) a reporting culture (all near-misses), (b) accountability culture (non-
discrimination), (c) educational culture (continuous training – toolbox talks), and (d) a non-authoritarian culture 
(team collaboration and trust) [1], [34]. For an organization to develop a safety culture, key performance 
indicators (KPI) address the lack of reporting of unsafe culture [34]. The following section addresses the 
international and local standards which serve as a guideline to prevent and mitigate dust and gas explosion. 
 
2.5 Global standards 
Globalization has allowed for ease of access to information and ease of access to common quality goods and 
common standard services [48]. To ensure relevancy and consistency of standards, The International Standards 
Organization (ISO) is responsible for the process of definition; harmonization, and integration of international 
standards within different sectors [22]. This section covers the two international standards originating from Europe 
(IEC) and Americas (API) which will be compared to the South African standards. 
 
2.5.1 International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
The European directives were implemented during the formation of the European Council in 1957. These 
directives were accepted into the industry as international standards, International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC) 60079 is responsible for the publications [49]. A problem had been identified of various member states, 
safety regulations regarding explosible atmospheres. The old approach directives which only applied to electrical 
equipment, resulted in manufacturers running different tests for different countries' certification standards [50]. 
Moreover, manufacturers of non-electrical equipment performed a voluntary product certification which leads to a 
lack of compliance from end-users and in industrial explosions [50]. Bouillard [30], suggested that a need for 
harmonization of the regulatory standards was identified, thus the development of ATEX (95 & 137) directives. 
ATEX an acronym for ‘Atmospheres explosibles’ is French for ‘potentially explosible atmospheres’ [20]. 
ATEX directive 95 also known as (94/9/EC) applies to both electrical and non-electrical equipment, active 
engineered safety devices, components, and control devices that are designed for use in a potentially explosible 
atmosphere [20], [50]. It is responsible for the deployment of conformity assessment procedures, which authorized 
testing individuals to perform and mark the equipment with a ‘CE’ mark for verification of compliance [23]. ATEX 
directive 95 defines ATEX zones as places in which atmospheres are explosible at different levels of severity, it 
categorizes explosible zones in terms of dust and gases, however, hybrid mixtures are not considered in this 
directive [20], [23], [24]. Table 5 below, shows the categorization of ATEX zones and the allowable fuel exposure 
durations, the zones are categorized as:  
• Zone 0/ 20 -  gas/ dust continuously present – where explosible is continuously present in the atmosphere 
for more than 1 000 hours per year;  
• Zone 1/ 21 – gas/ dust likely to be present - where explosible is occasionally present in the atmosphere 
between 10 and 1 000 hours per year and  
• Zone 2/ 22 – gas/ dust not likely to occur to be present – where explosible is rarely present in the 





Table 5: ATEX zone categories and exposure durations. 
Relationship between ATEX Zones 
 Fuel Exposure Durations  
( hours /year) 
ATEX Zone Number 
Dust Gases 
gas/ dust continuously present  > 1 000 hrs/yr  20 0 
gas/ dust likely to be present  10 and 1 000 hrs/yr 21 1 
gas/ dust not likely to occur to be present  < 10 hrs/yr 22 2 
 
When area classification is done and all the areas (zones) have been defined based on exposure lengths, the 
engineers can now determine which equipment is suitable for operation in a specific area (zone). Moreover, 
engineers can select an explosion prevention solution (e.g. ventilation) to convert an area from an extremely 
hazardous area - Zone 1/21 to a less hazardous area known as Zone 2/22. Therefore, in general, 80% of all ATEX 
Zones are set as Zone 2/22 [14] 
 
2.5.2 American Petroleum Institute (API) 
In North America, the American Petroleum Institute (API) is deployed to classify hazardous locations [23]. The 
API works in conjunction with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) [23], [49], [52]. These two bodies 
have published series of explosion and fire prevention standards for each relevant industry processing dust or 
gas. Tommasini, Pons, and Palamara. [23] states that the first approach for classification is through the 
implementation of API 500 / API 505 and NFPA 497 / NFPA 499 which states that hazardous locations are to be 
classified as Class I; Division 1 or Division 2. 
• Division 1 – explosible concentrations of flammable dust, gases & vapors can exist under normal 
conditions [23]. 
• Division 2 – explosible concentrations of flammable dust, gases & vapor leaks and are present only in 
rare abnormal process conditions such as over-pressurization due to a cooling tower fan failure or cooling 
water supply pump failure. The occurrence of the rapture is due to the inability to contain the explosible 
concentration within a division 1 equipment – resulting in exposure [23]. 
The North American system classifies explosible atmospheres as divisions [23]. Its standards involve fewer 
calculations for the application at hand. It also neglects spaces that have a high probability of the presence of 
combustible gas which can result in over/underestimation of the division [49], [52]. As a result Seitz et al [49], 
found, that since the year 2005 newly built plants/ processes in North America and its allies (government large 
scale projects) were converting to the internationally recognized IEC 60079 series standard [49] as it is more 
comprehensive in zone classification. The API standard only has two divisions of classification (Division 1 and 2) 
which are equivalent to (Zone 0/20 and 2/22) which means the API standard neglects the areas classified as Zone 
1/21 in the IEC standard [49]. Figure 11, shows the different zones during a road tanker offloading process. The 
areas marked zone zero are storage containers where the hazardous substance is present. The shaded areas 
represent the operating area (zone 1) in which hazardous substance is present. The surrounding area is an area 





Figure 11: Hazardous substance road tanker offloading process (explosible zones) [14] 
 
2.6 Local standards 
This section covered the South African National Standards (SANS), which are published by the South African 
Bureau of Standards (SABS). The two national standards covered in this section relate to the area classification 
SANS 10108 and explosion detection; mitigation and prevention SANS 60079 
 
2.6.1 South African National Standard (SANS 10108) 
The South African National Standard 10108 covered the classification of areas in which explosions could occur, 
detailing the proper selection of electrical equipment and mechanical equipment [22]. The standard further 
detailed the regulations, regarding persons responsible for the risk management of explosion [24], for example : 
• EIR 4(1) state - No person shall install an electrical installation other than following a safety standard;  
• EMR 8(1) state - No person may use electrical machinery in locations where there is a danger of fire or 
explosion owing to the present; and  
• R21.17.1 state -The manager shall identify and define hazardous areas referred to in regulations [24].  
















Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 






Mine Health and Safety Act  
(Act 29 of 1996) 
R2(1) 
R21.17.1 
Mine Manager/ Plant Engineer General 
Manager 
(except in compulsory hazardous locations) 
EIR = Electrical Installation Regulations   EMR = Electrical Machinery Regulations  R = Regulation 
 
2.6.2 South African National Standard (SANS) 60079 series 
The South African National Standard 60079 series comprises 29 sections that cover dust and gas explosions, 
classification of areas, equipment protection by application electrical installation and maintenance, and gas/dust 
detection [22]. The standards have been adopted unchanged technically from the international series of IEC 
60079 [22]. 
 
2.7 Global standards (IEC/API/NFPA) versus Local standard (SANS) 
The South African local standards SANS 10108 and SANS 60079 are adopted technically unchanged from the 
international series of IEC 60079 [22]. The legal status of the standard is relevant to that of South African 
legislation. The South African standards are identical to those of Australia and New Zealand [22]. So, Benson [28] 
presents the standards required for the prevention of dust fires and explosions. The compliance standards 
comprise of American – NFPA; Australian/ New Zealand standards and South African standards referenced from 
the international IEC 60079 standard. Between the years 2000 and 2005, the Brazilian state-owned company 
Petrobras – the largest petroleum company in the South American region commenced the conversion of 
conversion from North American Division standards to the International IEC Zone standards [53]. Therefore, 
Rangel [53] and Benson [28] presents Table 7, which defined the standards to prevent gas fires and explosions 
caused by electrical/ sparking sources and non-sparking sources of ignition. 
The standards presented by Rangel [53] and Benson [28] in Table 7, below represent the compliance 






Table 7: Critical Standards required for dust and gas explosions prevention. 





AS/NZS 4745:2004 Code of practice for handling combustible dust   
AS/NZS 3833:2007 The storage and handling of mixed classes of dangerous 
goods, in packages and intermediate bulk containers-electrical. 
 
 
NFPA 654 The standard for the prevention of fire and dust explosions 
from the manufacturing, processing, and handling of 
combustible particulate solids 
 
 
SANS 10108 The classification of hazardous locations and the selection of 
apparatus for use in such locations 
 
 
NFPA 499 Recommended practice for the classification of combustible 
dust and hazardous (classified) locations for electrical 
installations in chemical process areas 
 
 
IEC 60079-10-2 Explosive atmospheres Part 10–2: classification of areas—
combustible dust atmospheres 
 
 




IEC 60079-1 Explosive atmospheres – Part 1: Equipment protection by a 
flameproof enclosure that can withstand the internal explosion 




IEC 60079-2 Explosive atmospheres – Part 2: Equipment protection by 
pressurized enclosures –where a special protective gas is 




IEC 60079-5 Explosive atmospheres – Part 5: Equipment protection by 
powder filling – where possible ignition sources are surrounded 
by filling material to prevent the ignition of an external 
explosive gas atmosphere [56]. 
 
 
IEC 60079-6 Explosive atmospheres – Part 6: Equipment protection by oil 
immersion – where parts of the electrical equipment are 
immersed in a protective liquid in such a way that an explosive 
gas atmosphere cannot be ignited [57]. 
 
 
IEC 60079-7 Explosive atmospheres – Part 7: Equipment protection by 
increased safety – where components are installed to give 
increased security against the possibility of excessive 






IEC 60079-11 Explosive atmospheres – Part 11: Equipment protection by 
intrinsic safety – where the type of protection is based on the 
restriction of electrical energy within equipment and restriction 
of interconnecting wiring exposed to the explosive atmosphere 
to a level below that which can cause ignition by either 
sparking or heating effects [59] 
 
 
IEC 60079-15 Explosive atmospheres – Part 15: Equipment protection by 
various modes of sealing- where the type of protection is 
based on hermetically sealing, limiting sparks, and restricting 
breathing (entry of vapors, gas, or mist) [60] 
 
 
IEC 60079-17 Explosive atmospheres—Part 17: electrical installations 
inspection and maintenance 
  
IEC 60079-18 Explosive atmospheres – Part 18: Equipment protection by 
encapsulation – where the type of protection is by fully 
enclosing parts that are capable of igniting an explosive 
atmosphere by either sparking or heating are using a 





Electrical equipment for explosive gas atmospheres—





Electrical apparatus for use in the presence of combustible 
dust—classification of areas where combustible dust are or 
may be present 
 
 
AS/NZS 1020:1995  
SANS 10123 




2.8 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the literature to give a background of differences and similarities of dust and gas explosion, 
recommended prevention approaches, and standards. These are required to mitigate the risk presented by the 
processing of explosible dust and gas products. The dust and gas explosion prevention approaches were 
reviewed to understand how industrial loss prevention control can be further achieved. Moreover, additional loss 
prevention approaches were reviewed to understand the impact of the human factor and company culture in 
explosion prevention. A comparison between local and global standards was done to identify the most relevant 
global standards. Then, a review of the local standards was done to ensure their relevance – to the global 






3 Chapter 3: Research methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The current research seeks to identify the prevention approaches used to mitigate dust and gas explosions as 
per research question 1: What are the prevention approaches to mitigate dust and gas explosions. This identifies 
the various prevention approaches in the hierarchy of loss prevention control ranking from most effective to less 
effective. Furthermore, research question 2: What are the gaps that exist between global and local standards on 
explosion prevention, identifies the most relevant standard globally and locally. It assisted in identifying the gap 
between South African standards and global standards. The research methodology selected to perform this 
research is discussed below. 
 
3.2 Research design 
To execute the research effectively, planning and designing the research process is critical to identifying the 
research method. The consideration of the research questions in chapter 1, is vital for identifying the most suitable 
research methodology. Du Toit [62], advised a focus on fulfilling the four research paradigms rather than focusing 
on choosing a subjective research methodology. The research paradigms were: ontology and epistemology, the 
former is based on reality; and the latter described the relationship between reality and the study and whereby 
the methodology was a technique used by the study to discover that reality. The four science paradigms are 
positivism, realism, constructivism, and critical theory [62],  
 
3.3 Research methodology suitable for this research 
3.3.1 Survey methodology 
This research was conducted using a survey. A survey is defined as a technique for gathering information from a 
group of participants [63]. A survey is considered as a communication process between the study and 
respondents, whereby the outcome of this process leads to sharing and comprehension of the relevant topics in 
question [64]. 
Various authors [63], [65] stated that a survey research methodology is one of the most important areas of 
measurement in applied research. The process of execution of the survey began with the structuring of questions 
and comprehension of the questions to be posed to participants [66]. The respondent retrieval of relevant 
information from memory was critical as it allowed the participant to feel engaged in the survey [64]. Furthermore, 
the study was able to determine the respondent’s motivation and readiness to be truthful when participating in the 
survey [64], [67]. 
 
3.3.2 Survey design protocol and planning 
For the success of this research and achievement of the desired results for data collection. The research aimed 
to address and consider the following questions [68]; 




2. What is the industry to be studied?  
3. What the study seeks to know (Research Questions)? 
3. How the data will be collected (Methods to be used)?  
3.3.3 Objective of survey 
The survey study aimed to attain an in-depth understanding of the safety prevention approaches and standards 
to mitigate dust and gas explosions. The research questions posed in chapter 1 of this report were answered 
through attaining responses from participants of a survey questionnaire. The survey questionnaire responses 
were critically analyzed with referral to literature focusing on the hierarchy of loss prevention control proposed by 
Amyotte and Eckhoff [1].  
 
3.3.4 Industries to be studied 
The industry of focus was the edible oil manufacturers and edible oil by-product processors. The study selected 
the edible oil industry as the researcher was exposed to this environment. Moreover, the presence of hazardous 
substances (dust; hydrocarbon gas; hydrocarbon liquids, and edible oil) within this industry – implored the need 
for research. The sample frame may not fully represent the consensus within the industry, because the nature of 
operations differs between various edible oil manufacturers and processors, although the manufacturing process 
is the same. 
3.3.5 Intention of the study (Research questions) 
The current study utilized a survey questionnaire posed to industry professionals and experts on whether the 
critical safety prevention approaches were known and enforced at the participant's site. Moreover, the industry 
experts were asked to rate various local and global standards based on their experience and knowledge of the 
significance of the standards within their organization. The knowledge of prevention approaches and standards 
were used to determine if a knowledge gap exists in the dust and gas explosion prevention and mitigation 
approaches. 
 
3.3.6 Data to be gathered 
Data collected for this research was quantitatively based on the responses received from the questionnaires which 
were sent out to participants. A Likert scale was used to categorize the scoring, it offered various advantages 
such as (a) relatively quick data gathering for a large number of respondents, (b) provided participant’s 
ability/knowledge estimates [69].  
 
3.3.7 Limitations of the research 
Limitations in the research were due to the small sample size of participants within the edible oil industry, this 
could affect the ability to make statistical conclusions – moreover, lack of response from the selected sample can 





3.4 Design data collection protocol 
3.4.1 Methods of data collection 
Responses were collected using an online survey questionnaire to compare literature with the received 
responses. Therefore validating or invalidating the research questions and reaching a conclusion [68]. Data 
collection methods used were a survey questionnaire and literature [68]. Figure 12 presents the process of data 
collection protocol  
 
Figure 12: Data collection protocol 
 
3.4.2 Survey questionnaire 
The study selected edible oil manufacturers and processors as the sample frame. The study emphasized the 
question encoding which was in tune with the language of participants [64]. In this case, various engineering 
safety jargon was used as the level of education of the participants was complex. The survey consisted of two 
sections. The first section questions were demographics based – focusing on the respondent’s job title and 
company manufacturing process. The second section questions were a combination of process safety knowledge; 
personnel attitudes and behavioral traits derived from the research questions. Table 8, outlined the research 

















Table 8: Survey questionnaire design 
Question 1  What are the prevention 
approaches to mitigate 
dust and gas explosions? 
The research question seeks to uncover 
whether the participants were aware of the 
prevention approaches within their 
environment and to determine the amount of 
usage of these prevention approaches as 
per Figure 9. 
Linked with 
section 2.4 in 
the literature 
review. 
Question 2 What are the gaps that 
exist between global and 
local standards on 
explosion prevention? 
The research question seeks to uncover 
which standards between global and local 
standards, do participants deem as 
significant to implement. 
Linked with 





Peterson. [67], argued that the question design aimed to ensure that participants' tasks were simplified by 
minimizing the reasons for not responding. 
 
3.4.3 Sampling decision 
To increase the respondent’s comprehension, the study ensured questions and statements were as short as 
possible [64]. The general advice by Lietz [64], was to ensure the number of words within a survey question was 
between 16 to 20 words per sentence. Moreover, Peterson [67] advised choosing between the usage of open-
end or close-end survey questions, the former being survey questions in which participants used their own words 
and the latter being survey questions which participants do not use their own words. Close-end survey questions 
are conducted through a Likert scale. A Likert scale is a psychometric scale that has multiple categories from 
which participants choose to indicate their opinions, attitudes, or feelings about a particular issue [69]. The industry 
of focus was the edible oil manufacturers and edible oil by-product processors. The selected sample frame was 
the edible oil industry as the researcher was exposed to this environment. Moreover, the presence of hazardous 
substances (dust; hydrocarbon gas; hydrocarbon liquids, and edible oil) within this industry – implored the need 
for research. The sample frame may not fully represent the general consensus within the industry, because the 
nature of operations differs between various edible oil manufacturers and processors, although the manufacturing 
process is the same. There are approximately 13 edible oil manufacturers and processors in the Gauteng 
province. The sample frame consisted of highly industrialized manufactures and Small Medium Enterprises 
manufactures. The current study focused on a closed-ended survey. These type of questions were chosen 
because they minimize need for physical interaction surveys [33]. Expectedly, the current global pandemic 
COVID-19 – presented limitations as participants at their workplaces were faced with challenges of observing the 




3.4.4 Determining resources 
To effectively complete the survey data collection, cost planning was imperative. As [66], [67], suggested, to 
compare the cost of research methods, based on (i) time spent to prepare and perform survey; (ii) amount of 
money to execute survey and (iii)  effort to execute survey – population size and geographic distribution. Web and 
mail surveys were cheap and quick to execute, these methods were less affected by the variables of population 
size and geographical distribution. However, based on time mail surveys were less effective as compared to web 
surveys as they can take up to 8 weeks for response [66], [67]. Regarding telephone and face-to-face interviewing, 
the latter was less effective as it required training of interviewing personnel; traveling; physical interaction [66], 
[67]. Table 9, shows the comparison of different survey methods based on costs and ethical objection. 
 






Effort to execute 
Size and distribution 
Possible ethical 
objection 
Web Cheap Quick Easy – not impacted by size nor 
distribution 
Lack of consent 
Mail Cheap Long Moderate – impacted by the 
respondent. 
Lack of consent and 
breach of privacy 
Telephone Moderate Quick Easy – not impacted by size nor 
distribution 
Breach of privacy  
Use of deception 
Face-to-Face Expensive Long Intensive  Use of deception 
 
A combination of two methods was chosen to execute the survey, with the main research methodology being a 
web-based survey:  
• The cover letter and survey link was sent via e-mail 
• The survey was hosted on a web-based platform known as www.surveymonkey.com 
Once the best method of conducting the survey was chosen, the following phase was to conduct a pre-test of the 
survey questionnaire [66]. 
3.4.5 Pre-testing 
The pre-testing phase was meant to give the designed survey and sample population a trial to monitor for errors 
[66]. To prepare for the pre-testing, a sample frame needed to be compiled or identified if it pre-exists for the 
target population. Lastly, the survey questions were drafted from literature or pre-existing questionnaires from 
other authors [66], [67]. Czaja and Blair [66] suggested, that during the pre-testing phase one should question 
how participants would perceive and interpret specific questions – hence testing the survey on fellow peers or 





3.5 Data collection 
Quantitative data was collected through conducting a questionnaire, participants were requested to score and 
rank statements derived from literature review using the Likert scale. The questionnaire was sent to pre-selected 
participants within the edible oil industry. The questionnaire was sent to participants through a survey platform– 
with instructions detailing the sequence of the questions asked. The questionnaire was designed to be easily 
understood and completed by the participants. 
3.5.1 Target population 
The current study is to be conducted in South Africa, mainly focusing on the edible oil manufacturers and 
processors within the Gauteng region. The following professionals were identified as possible participants for the 
questionnaire: Site Engineers (GCC); Production managers; Engineers (process and safety) and Health and 
Safety officers. 
• The questionnaire was addressed to site engineers as they are legally appointed as per the department 
of labor regulations to manage and authorize all hazardous work within the site. They are trained and 
experienced in both mechanical and electrical engineering principles which are critical disciplines within 
the production environments. They are held responsible for any incidents that occur on-site. 
• The questionnaire was addressed to production managers as they are the direct persons in charge of all 
production areas and human resources. They are experienced in process management and they 
understand and manage all risks associated with raw materials; by-products and final products within the 
process. 
• The questionnaire was addressed to process/safety engineers who work in close relationships with 
production managers and health and safety officers. They possess an in-depth understanding of process 
parameters, equipment design, and functionality. Their duties are to ensure the process is operated, 
controlled, and managed safely at all times and to minimize the risk posed by contractors – through 
contractor management standards. 
• The questionnaire was addressed to health and safety officers who have first-hand experience of 
challenges in the production areas. Their duties are to enforce safety regulations through hazard 
identification and risk assessment – they identify and report non-conformances caused by all employees 
including management.  
The study targeted 10 edible oil manufacturers and processors within the Gauteng region. The table below depicts 
the notable people involved in the production plants to be studied. The expectation was responses from 20 people 
will be received.  
Table 10: Personnel involved in production plants 
People involved in the production 
Site Engineers 5 
Production Managers 5 
Process / Safety Engineer 5 
Health and Safety Officers 5 





3.6 Data analysis 
3.6.1 Quantitative data analysis method 
Quantitative data analysis presented an opportunity to summarize large amounts of data and to make objective 
predictions about future trends [62]. Moreover, Du Toit [62] suggested a clear and logical rationale for the 
procedures be used to arrange and organize such data. Du Toit [62] confirmed, quantitative research as one of 
the most vital indicators of validity. 
The external validity of a quantitative study was threatened by the following problems: population, time, and 
ecological validity. 
• ‘Population validity’ referred to whether pre-empted conclusions can be drawn from a study of a specific 
population. The questions analyzed whether a relationship between the studied variables exists in large 
population size. Moreover; to question whether the validity of the population was affected by the 
population size being small [62], [70]. 
• ‘Time validity’ referred to whether results of a specific study performed at a specified time could be 
generalized concerning other periods [62], [70] 
• ‘Environmental validity’ referred to the evaluation of environmental factors that contribute to specific 
incidents [62], [70].  To further evaluate and analyze compound causational reasons of environmental 
factors that contributed to specific incidents in case study history [70]. 
3.6.2 Likert scale rankings 
Data were analyzed using the Likert scale rankings. Beglar and Nemoto [69], recommended Likert scale range 
be kept between three scales and six scales. Because Likert scales with more than six category scale are rarely 
justifiable as they resulted in lack of concentration and memory recapitulation of the participants. 
A Likert scale measurement model allowed the evaluation and validation of responses. Beglar and Nemoto [69], 
suggested two measurement models namely, the True score model and the Rasch model. The true score model 
is equation-based as per the following equation: Observed score = True score + Error. The Rasch model consists 
of two models for analyzing Likert-scale data: The partial-credit model and the rating scale model which are 
available from the Winsteps Software package[69]. Formal measurement models such as the Rasch models are 
superior compared to the traditional true score model. This study used the true score model for data analysis.  
3.6.3 Ethical consideration 
Quantitative research involving humans through the utilization of survey questionnaires should be evaluated to 
ensure that participant's anonymity and confidentiality were maintained. However, anonymity and confidentiality 
account for a portion of the ethical principles required to ensure participants' protection. There are four ethical 
principles that a quantitative study thoroughly explored, namely autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and 
justice. 
 
Autonomy:  Participants completed the survey anonymously and no data that enabled the study to identify the 
respondents or the organization the respondent worked for was collected. Respondents were provided with 




the cover letter that was sent with the survey link. Participants who did not want to participate had the right to not 
complete the survey and withdraw. 
 
Beneficence:  The current study conducted, presented an indirect benefit to the participants, as it attempted to 
increase the knowledge about available explosion prevention approaches and also to offer guidance regarding 
the recommended global standards to be implemented within the edible oil industry. 
 
Non-maleficence:  The current study attempted to validate the existence of a knowledge gap between the local 
and global explosion prevention approaches for explosion prevention. The survey focused only on questions 
directly related to explosion prevention approaches and no personal or company data was collected or the 
geographical location of respondents was collected. 
 
Justice: Industry practitioners responsible for explosion prevention approaches were requested to complete the 
survey. The survey questions had been derived from literature review activities to ensure no personal opinions 
were introduced to protect the respondents and ensure no questions can cause harm or embarrassment.  
 
3.7 Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter, the research methodology and the process of data collection were presented and explained. To 
enable the study to answer the research questions presented in chapter one of this research, a questionnaire was 
designed using categories from the Likert scale. The data obtained through the questionnaire presented a point 
of view from industry professionals and experts. The obtained data were used to support and validate the data 
obtained from the analysis of literature. 
Industry professionals and experts from the edible oil industry were sent a survey questionnaire to obtain their 
views on critical prevention and mitigating approaches for dust and gas explosions. Findings from the data 
analyzed either validated or invalidated the existence of a knowledge gap within the South African standards and 
regulations compared to International best practices.  




4 Chapter 4: Results and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this research was to determine whether a gap existed within the South African local standards 
when compared with international standards. This was achieved by analyzing the explosion prevention 
approaches and explosion mitigating techniques. Also, the following research questions were asked: What are 
the prevention and mitigating approaches to dust and gas explosions, and what are the gaps that exist between 
global and local standards on explosion prevention. 
This chapter presented the collected data in a less complex manner. The survey questions regarding prevention 
and mitigating approaches to dust and gas explosions were extracted from the literature. The participants were 
asked closed-ended question’s which revealed their awareness and usage of the prevention and mitigating 
approaches. Thereby answering the first research question. Moreover, the participants were further asked to 
recommend local and international standards which they deemed critical for consideration; answering the second 
research question. 
4.2 Participants roles and process conditions 
The first question of the questionnaire was designed to understand the role which each respondent is occupying 
within their respective companies. The second question was designed to understand the processes that each 
respondent is currently exposed to. A total of 17 professionals within the edible oil industry participated in the 
survey. The results shown in Figure 13, indicate a total of seven site engineers; four process/ safety engineers, 
four health & safety officer, and two production managers participated in the survey. Figure 14, shows that of the 
17 respondents 59% are exposed to boiler operations, 41% are exposed to solvent extraction operations and 
53% are exposed to refining operations which are processes that contain coal dust, spent clay dust, vegetable 
seed-husk –meal dust-free fatty acids and hexane solvent which are highly flammable. Respondents exposed to 
dry silo storage where flammable dust concentrations are excessive were at least 29%. The remaining 41% of 
respondents exposed to bulk liquid storage and edible oil by-products were exposed to crude oil, refined oil, 
soapstock, and free fatty acids which are volatile due to the presence of hexane solvent which is a hydrocarbon 
with low flashing points. Even post refining the refined oil stored in large storage tanks poses a hazard, as refined 
oil flash point (>250°C) is lower than the heat range (1000°C) of maintenance welding machines. Welding 





Figure 13: Participants professional roles in the industry 
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4.3 Respondents awareness and utilization of principles related to explosion 
prevention control 
The third and fourth questions of the survey were designed to understand the level of awareness and utilization 
of each respondent regarding the principles of hierarchy loss prevention control outlined in Figure 9 in Chapter 
2. The results below were outlined based on the sub-headlines (2.3.1 to 2.3.7) in Chapter 2. 
 
Table 11: Awareness and Utilization of hazard identification & risk assessment 
Column A 
Level of Awareness 
  Column B 
















































Principles related to dust and 











































Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment: 
0% 6% 18% 47% 29% 
Q1: Identifying hazards and unsafe 
conditions presented by raw 
materials; chemical solvents; by-
products and finished goods. 
6% 6% 41% 18% 29% 
0% 12% 18% 46% 24% 
Q2: Understanding the hazards; 
causes and effects and how they 
interact with the holistic site system. 
12% 0% 24% 29% 35% 
 
Table 11, above represents the first principle of loss prevention control, which is hazard identification and risk 
assessment. None of the respondents were unaware of the first principle. Approximately 12 respondents (71%) 
were confidently aware (eight-moderately aware and five-extremely aware) of the first principle, and 2 respondents 
(12%) showed a slight awareness of the first principle and the remaining 3 respondents (18%) were unsure of 
their knowledge of the first principle. However, only 10 of the respondents (47%) utilize the first principle 
frequently. It further revealed that at least 4 respondents (24%) occasionally participate in hazard identification 
and risk assessment procedures within their organizations. The lack of utilization of the first principle was only by 
three respondents’ (12%). The survey reveals that three respondent’s professional roles were two site engineers 
and one health and safety officer (H&S). A site engineer is regarded as the highest engineering authority within a 
processing plant, with knowledge of occupational health and safety regulations. The site engineer is in charge of 
setting up systems to enforce a safe working environment. An H&S officer is the first line of action at enforcing 
safe working conditions through monitoring documentation of employees for hazardous work, issuing safe working 





Table 12: Awareness and Utilization of inherent and engineered safety approaches 
Column A 
Level of Awareness 
 
Column B 
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Inherent Safety Approach: 
18% 6% 24% 24% 28% 
Q3:Area classification -Zoning of 
Areas 
12% 12% 40% 18% 18% 
6% 18% 24% 24% 28% 
Q4:Hazard Elimination - Avoiding 
hazard 
6% 6% 35% 18% 35% 
12% 12% 12% 29% 35% 
Q5:Hazard Moderation- Reducing 
severity 
6% 24% 18% 24% 28% 
Engineered Safety Approach: 
0% 24% 12% 40% 24% 
Q6:Passive Barriers - Usage of 
safeguards such as vapor walls; 
steel structure and double door 
system 
12% 12% 28% 24% 24% 
6% 24% 18% 28% 24% 
Q7: Active Barriers - Usage of 
active systems such as fixed 
detectors; mobile detectors; 
sprinkling system; ventilation 
6% 18% 18% 34% 24% 
 
The second section of the hierarchy of loss prevention control is the inherent safety approach which is the 
elimination or moderation of hazards at the design phase and also area classifications. It can be expected to find 
fewer individuals who continuously utilize these approaches as many manufacturing companies utilize 
consultancy companies for the design of processes and plants and area classifications. Table 12, shows that a 
total of 10 respondents (59%) were confidently aware of the three inherent safety approaches (area classification; 
hazard moderation, and elimination), while only 6 of the respondents frequently use the three inherent safety 
approaches. The 6 respondents one is a production manager, two H&S officers, three site engineers, and two 
production/safety engineers. This data shows an even spread of professionals who utilize this critical step in loss 
prevention.  
The third section of the hierarchy of loss prevention control is the engineered safety approach which includes 
passive and active barriers. A total of 5 respondents (29%) was extremely aware of passive and active barriers 




engineers; one production manager and one H&S officer. It is expected that these 5 respondents should have an 
in-depth understanding of the SANS 60079 standards.  
Of the remaining 12 respondents, 8 (47%) were somewhat familiar with the barriers and occasionally used the 
passive and active barriers, while 4 respondents (24%) were slightly aware. The knowledge of the first three 
sections of the hierarchy of loss prevention control (hazard identification, inherent and engineered safety 
approaches) is expected to lead to a considerable awareness and usage of the fourth section of the hierarchy of 
loss prevention control, which is procedural safety. Procedural safety is directly linked to the safety culture [1] that 
an organization defines for its operations guided by the Department of Labour standards and regulations.  
 
Table 13: Awareness and Utilization of procedural safety management 
Column A 
Level of Awareness 
  Column B 















































e Principles related to dust and 











































Procedural Safety Management: 
6% 6% 12% 35% 41% 
Q9: Standard Operating 
Procedures 
6% 0% 18% 29% 47% 
0% 12% 18% 24% 46% 
Q10: Developing Safe 
Maintenance Procedures 
0% 6% 18% 23% 53% 
12% 6% 6% 17% 59% Q11: Housekeeping Procedures 6% 6% 23% 6% 59% 
 
Of the 17 respondents the results in Table 13 below, shows that a total of 9 respondents (52%) were confidently 
aware and fully utilized the tools (standard operating procedures (SOP), safe maintenance procedures, and 
housekeeping procedures) within procedural safety. Of the 9 respondents, two were production managers; two 
H&S officers; four site engineers, and one process/ safety engineer. The data concurs with literature that a strong 
human element is related to procedural safety; as the success or failure of a process is directly related to the 
performance of plant personnel from management and operators [1]. The results show that only two respondents 
(12%) who occupy the role of process/ safety engineers were slightly aware and never utilized these procedures. 
The cause of process/ safety engineers' lack of knowledge and utilization could stem from the lack of training or 
exposure to such as they contribute less to the daily work tasks of certain professionals [1]. The remaining 6 
respondents (35%) were slightly aware and occasionally utilized the procedures. The data shows that the role of 
management within procedural safety is emphasized within the organizations of the respondents. 
However, organizational emphasis regarding procedural safety is imperative but the critical factor for achieving 
total awareness within the fourth section (procedural safety) is the implementation of the fifth section (process 
safety management). The fifth section emphasizes the legal appointing of individuals within management as per 





To increase awareness of process safety management, legal appointments [24] should be carried out together 
with the classifications of process risk management which includes the process and equipment integrity 
certifications [1], [13]. Literature defines the site engineer and head of department as those who are responsible 
for high-level management of process safety management [24]. Table 14, below reveal that of the 17 respondents 
only 5 respondents (24%) were extremely aware and 3 respondents (18%) were familiar to moderately aware of 
the process safety management tools. However, a total of 7 respondents (41%) frequently use process safety 
management tools. These seven respondents are one process/ safety engineer, three site engineers, one H&S 
officer, and two production managers. 
 
 














Considering Figure 15, results in Table 14, validate the literature regarding the professionals who are most likely 
aware and utilize process safety management tools. However, the distribution of the extremely aware 
professionals should be larger as the survey was sent to at least 10 organizations and with seven of the 
respondents (41%) being site engineers and who is the highest authority regarding safety enforcement and 
implementation as per SA standard and regulations. Two site engineers (12%) were unaware and never used 
process safety management tools. As per this study, the site engineer was the highest personnel surveyed, hence 
the expectation that process safety management would be well understood and utilized.  
 
Table 14: Awareness and Utilization of process safety management 
Column A 
Level of Awareness 
  Column B 

















































Principles related to dust and gas 










































Process Safety Management 
6% 12% 29% 18% 35% 
Q12: Legal Liability  Compliance - 
Legal appointments of management 
personnel 
0% 6% 29% 6% 59% 
6% 18% 24% 24% 28% Q13: Process Risk Management 6% 18% 12% 24% 40% 
18% 24% 28% 6% 24% 
Q14: Process/ Equipment Integrity 
(Annual re-certification of pressure 
vessels) 
24% 0% 29% 18% 29% 
 
In the last section presented below in Table 15, the hierarchy of loss prevention control relates to organizational 
policies and incident management. As per literature, the study revised the hierarchy of loss prevention control 
presented by [1] in Figure 6 To create Figure 9, which comprises of human factor influence and training of plant 
personnel as per individual development goal setting; only, one respondent (6%) was unaware and two 
respondents (12%) did not utilize the company policies and incident management tools. The results reveal that 
these two respondents were one H&S officer and one process/ safety engineer. A total of 6 respondents (35%) 
was extremely aware and utilized the company policies and incident management tools. The distribution in this 
section should represent more awareness and utilization as most organizations have to enforce code of conducts, 





Table 15: Awareness and Utilization of company policies and incident management 
Column A 
Level of Awareness 
 
Column B 
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Company Policies & Incident Management 
6% 12% 6% 41% 35% 
Q15: Code of Conduct and 
Disciplinary Procedures 
0% 0% 30% 30% 40% 
0% 6% 12% 47% 35% 
Q16: Company standards and  
Regulations 
0% 7% 17% 17% 59% 
6% 12% 18% 35% 29% 
Q17: Goal setting and Human Factor 
Performance Monitoring 
12% 12% 12% 40% 24% 
0% 12% 12% 29% 47% 
Q18: Training and Enhancing of 
Process Safety Knowledge 
6% 6% 18% 23% 47% 
 
The positive outcome is that most (10) of the respondents (59%) were familiar and sometimes utilized the 
company policies and incident management tools. Various authors [1], [13], [31], [71] emphasized the significance 
of company policies in guiding the safety narrative within a specific organization. Employees are required to be 
informed of company policies, standards, and regulations, individual performance expectations through goal 
setting, and disciplinary procedures for violators of policies and procedures. Moreover, continuous training 
enhances process knowledge and incident reporting and management. More respondents were expected to 
understand the last section of the hierarchy of loss prevention control as it directly focuses on human resources 
management. Amyotte and Eckhoff [1] stated that the role of management is imperative to achieving overall safety 





4.4 Respondents awareness of local and international safety standards 
It was expected from the literature that the distribution on the hierarchy of loss prevention control should represent 
a similar outcome with the last question of the survey. It focused on the local and international standards. 
Respondents were asked to rate critical local or international standards based on usage. The results are 
presented below in Figure 16.  
 
 












































































Q19: AS/NZS 1020:1995 /SANS 10123
Local & International Standards




To understand which standards the respondents were exposed to, the results were subdivided based on the 
origin of the standards. Thus, three subdivisions were analyzed which relate to literature in section 2.6 of 
chapter 2. This includes two international standards bodies (International Electrotechnical Commission and 
American Petroleum Institute) and (South African National Standards/ Australia New Zealand). 
 
International Electrotechnical Commission 
 
Table 16: International Electrotechnical Commission Standards 








IEC 60079-0 - Standard for explosive atmospheres—
Part 0: equipment—general requirements 
0% 53% 47% 
IEC 60079-1 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 1: Equipment protection by flameproof enclosure. 
0% 18% 82% 
IEC 60079-2 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 2: Equipment protection by pressurized 
enclosures  
6% 35% 59% 
IEC 60079-5 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 5: Equipment protection by powder filling. 
0% 47% 53% 
IEC 60079-6 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 6: Equipment protection by oil immersion. 
6% 47% 47% 
IEC 60079-7 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 7: Equipment protection by increased safety. 
6% 35% 59% 
IEC 60079-10-2 - Standard  for explosive atmospheres 
Part 10–2: classification of areas—combustible dust 
atmospheres 
6% 29% 65% 
IEC 60079-11 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 11: Equipment protection by intrinsic safety  
12% 18% 70% 
IEC 60079-15 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 15: Equipment protection by various modes of 
sealing. 
0% 47% 53% 
IEC 60079-17 - Standard for explosive atmospheres—
Part 17: electrical installations inspection and 
maintenance 
6% 29% 65% 
IEC 60079-18 - 6Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 18: Equipment protection by encapsulation. 
6% 41% 53% 
 
Table 16, represents the IEC standards that were most common within the industry as these standards were used 
as guidelines for the South African local standards. A total of 10 respondents (58%) would consider all 11 IEC 
standards. Fourteen respondents (82%) showed more consideration for IEC-60079-1, a standard for explosive 




11 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 11: Equipment protection by intrinsic safety/. These standards 
were common for most passive and active barriers systems (engineered safety approach) which 12 respondents 
(71%) above confirmed knowledge of in Table 12. It is concerning that a total of 9 respondents (53%) were unsure 
whether they would consider IEC 60079-0 - Standard for explosive atmospheres—Part 0: equipment—general 
requirements-, as this is the basic summary of the 11 standards. These respondents were 4 site engineers, 1 
production manager, 2 production/safety engineers, and 2 H&S officers. Based on Table 12, it was expected for 
less than 6 respondents to consider IEC 60079-5 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 5: Equipment 
protection by powder filling; as only 5 respondents confirmed working with dry silo storage. However, a total of 9 




Table 17: American Standards 







NFPA 654 - Standard for the prevention of fire and dust 
explosions from the manufacturing, processing, and 
handling of combustible particulate solids 
0% 24% 76% 
NFPA 499 - Standard for the classification of combustible 
dust and of hazardous (classified) locations for electrical 
installations in chemical process areas 
0% 29% 71% 
 
Table 17, above represents the knowledge that respondents possess regarding American standards. It can be 
seen that a total of 12 respondents (71%) were aware of the NFPA regulations regarding dust and hazard 
chemical classifications. Only 5 respondents were not confident regarding the consideration of NFPA regulations. 
The distribution shows that of the 5 respondents not sure two were H&S officers, and one site engineer, one 
production manager, and one process/safety engineer. The reason could be lack of exposure to international 
standards due to the company being fully South African owned and with lack of international exposure. Of the 
companies surveyed two companies had little to no international management or exposure. The knowledge of the 
NFPA showed that respondents were exposed to American standards which could be due to the regulation that 
enforces organizations to appoint a fire engineer to facilitate the study, validation, and implementation of an 




Table 18, below shows a total of 10 respondents (59%) confirmed consideration of the South African; 
Australia/New Zealand standards recommended by the IEC. However, 6 respondents (35%) were not sure 
whether they would consider the South African; Australia/New Zealand standards recommended by the IEC. 
Only 1 respondent would not consider SANS 10108 - Standard for the classification of hazardous locations and 







Table 18: SANS/AS/NZ Standards 







SANS 10108 - Standard for the classification of hazardous 
locations and the selection of apparatus for use in such 
locations 
12% 23% 65% 
AS/NZS 4745:2004 - Standard for handling of combustible 
dusts 
6% 29% 65% 
AS/NZS 3833:2007 - Standard for the storage and handling 
of mixed classes of dangerous goods. 6% 24% 70% 
AS/NZS 2381.1:2005 - Standard for electrical equipment 
within explosive gas atmospheres—selection, installation, 
and maintenance—general requirements 
6% 41% 53% 
AS/NZS 61241.10:2005 - Standard for electrical apparatus 
for use in the presence of combustible dust—classification 
of areas where combustible dusts are or may be present 
6% 47% 47% 
AS/NZS 1020:1995 /SANS 10123 - Standard for the control of 
undesirable static electricity 6% 47% 47% 
 
4.5 Discussion 
The results obtained from the survey were not consistent with the literature. The size of the sample selected could 
be too small or participants' work experience could be of entry to intermediate level. 
• Findings showed that all respondents were aware of the first principle of loss prevention and 65% of 
respondents utilized the first principle – hazard identification and risk assessment. Awareness and 
utilization of the first principle are vital as it means participants can classify hazards and assess the risk 
posed by the hazards. 
• The lack of utilization (35%) of the second principle of loss prevention control was noted and the possible 
cause is due to manufacturing and processing companies outsourcing process design and project 
management to Engineering Procurement Consulting Management (EPCM) companies. 
• Furthermore, it was noted that the lack of awareness and utilization (40%) of the third principle (passive 
barriers) suggests that the organizations surveyed possibly outsource the design and project 
management to EPCM companies.  
Passive barriers are strategically positioned and most of the time passive barriers are in a form of main plant steel 
structure, equipment positioning, and plant walkways, which are identified and confirmed during the design phase 
of a process/plant.  
• However, it shows that at least 10 respondents were aware of active barriers – this could be influenced 
by the type of active barriers utilized – these are easy to identify, they are continuously active – giving 
feedback to the end-user and form part of the emergency plan.  
• All the respondents were aware of the fourth principle of loss prevention – procedural safety management. 




• A total of 55% of the respondents showed awareness of their legal liability and it is expected that they 
have been officially appointed as they frequently utilize the legal compliance. 
• Furthermore, it was noted that 65% of respondents were aware of the first principles, this corresponds 
with the feedback received regarding the fifth principle of process risk management 
• Most of the respondents (82%) were aware of the sixth principle of loss prevention. It is expected that 
respondents be aware of company policies as their roles in the organizations is that of middle and senior 
management. 
• Only 1 respondent (6%) would not recommend IEC and SANS/AU/NZ standards 
• A total of 6 respondents (35%) might or might not consider IEC and SANS/AU/NZ standards 
• A total of 10 respondents (59%) definitely would consider IEC and SANS/AU/NZ standards 
• All of the respondents would recommend American standards, however, a total of 5 respondents (27%) 
might or might not consider American standards. 
• A total of 12 respondents (73%) definitely would consider American standards. 
Respondents' knowledge of the principles of loss prevention was noted to be average and required further 
reiteration and re-training. The respondents showed an overwhelming knowledge of American standards, with 
none of the respondents negatively rating the American standards. Furthermore, the respondents showed that 
they understood the similarities of the IEC and SANS standards. The results are conclusive that the relation 
between IEC and SANS is understood. 
However, respondents who were not confident about their awareness and utilization are a total of 4 respondents 
(25%). 
4.6 Chapter conclusion 
In this chapter, data collected through survey questionnaires and literature were analyzed and results presented. 
Findings show that at least 10 respondents were aware of the first principle of loss prevention – hazard 
identification and risk assessment.  
At least 12 respondents (73%) would consider American standards – this is inconsistent with literature, as South 
African national standards recommend IEC standards above American standards.  
However, only 10 respondents (59%) would consider both IEC and SANS/AU/NZ standards, this is consistent 
with the literature as IEC standards are a benchmarking for SANS/AU/NZ standards. 
 
Literature has shown a drive to implement IEC standards instead of American standards [53], [72]. The fact that 
almost all respondents were aware of American standards could mean that errors can be made when classifying 
hazardous zones and implementing principles of loss prevention. 
 






5 Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
5.1 Summary of research objectives 
This chapter presents a summary of the research objectives and recommendations to be implemented. The 
purpose of the research was to identify and establish the existing gaps between South Africa and global best 
practices on the causes, prevention, and mitigation of dust and gas explosions. It explored the awareness of 
various regulations that are prescribed by the South African National Standards and investigated the utilization 
by industry experts as compared to prescribed international regulations and standards 
The two research questions which were examined to assist in effectively completing this study were as follows: 
1. What are the prevention and mitigation approaches to dust and gas explosions? 
2. What are the variations between global and local standards on explosion prevention?  
5.2 Findings to research question 1 
What are the prevention and mitigation approaches to dust and gas explosions? 
The research question strived to define international best practice prevention and mitigation approaches as per 
past and recent literature review was done in chapter 2. A survey questionnaire was generated by using the 
reviewed hierarchy of loss prevention control principles suggested by Amyotte and Eckhoff [1] presented in Figure 
9. The survey questionnaire was used to investigate the existence of the knowledge gap within South African 
industry experts and professionals. Figure 17, below shows the feedback from respondents with knowledge gaps 
color-coded. 
 
5.2.1 Gap 1: Inherent safety approach 
A significant gap exists in the second section of the hierarchy of loss prevention control which is the inherent 
safety approach. Elimination or moderation of hazards at the design phase and also area classifications. 
Respondents showed a lack of awareness and utilization of area classification information. The lack of exposure 
can be attributed to production companies outsourcing the design of processes and plants and area classifications 
to consultancy companies. This knowledge gap within industry professionals can be detrimental – as accidents 
can occur in areas that required re-zoning (area classification) and segregation when performing site upgrades. 
Industrial accidents [7][8][9]–[12] referred to in chapter 1, are typical examples of explosions occurrences. Various 
authors, Auret [24], Junior [72], and Rangel [73] recommend area classification to be done by specialists as it is 
complex in some cases. However, organizations may not always seek the expertise of area classification experts 
for a small plant or site upgrades.  
 
5.2.2 Gap 2: Engineered safety approach 
Responses noted on questions 6 and 7 which covered the third principle of the hierarchy of loss prevention control, 
show that 11 respondents (65%) responded confidently in awareness of passive barriers, but only 8 respondents 
frequently utilize and 3 respondents who responded in awareness of passive barriers. This shows that 




poor decision-making when encountering an emergency- as the knowledge of the safer areas of the plants or site 
is critical. One respondent who responded to utilize active barriers showed a lack of awareness. This shows a 
risk as the professional is not confident of their awareness yet they utilize active engineered systems. Lack of 
awareness can lead to a lack of knowledge of calibration and usage of portable and fixed dust and gas detection 
systems and operating principles, thus leading to inconsistent readings from portable and fixed active engineered 
systems and consequent misapplication of active engineered systems  
 




5.2.3 Gap 3: Process safety management 
Inconsistent responses were noted on questions 12 and 13 which covered the fifth principle of the hierarchy of 
loss prevention focusing on legal liability compliance (permit to work procedure), management of change, and 
process risk management. It was noted that 9 respondents (53%) showed confident awareness but 11 
respondents (65%) utilized the principles. The 2 respondents showed utilization of permit to work issuance 
procedures but lack awareness of legal liability compliance. The gap exists as organizations are required to ensure 
awareness and legal appointments of management as per Figure 15. It was further noted that there was poor 
awareness of process and equipment integrity, as only 5 respondents (29%) showed awareness. However, 8 
respondents (47%) showed utilization of the annual recertification of pressure vessels. The results show a gap 
exists as less than 50% of the respondents showed awareness to pressure vessel re-certification, moreover, 3 
respondents showed inconsistencies, of utilizing yet without awareness of the reasons, and the importance.  
5.3 Findings to research question 2 
What are the gaps that exist between global and local standards on explosion prevention?  
The research question strived to identify variations between global and local standards on explosion prevention 
as per past and recent literature review was done in chapter 2. A survey questionnaire was generated by using 
the identified and suggested standards by various experts and authors [24], [28], [73] presented in Table 7 in 
chapter 2. The survey questionnaire was used to identify if a knowledge gap existed among South African industry 
experts and professionals. 
Research question 2, has no significant gap as the results show that respondents are practicing, it was noted that 
the level of awareness was lower than the usage. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The key finding derived from this research has answered the research questions posed. The limitations of the 
study were due to the small sample frame. Limiting the amount of expert respondent’s participation in the survey 
across the industry. The problem statement was; There exists a knowledge gap between international best 
practices to prevent and mitigate dust and gas explosions and the South African local explosion 
regulations. 
Literature shows that South African National Standards (SANS) are derived from SABS which is an affiliate of the 
International Electrotechnical Commission. Thus, standards are published under the IEC, with minimum 
modifications. 
Gaps were identified in the explosion prevention and mitigation approach principles namely; inherent safety 
approach, engineered safety approach, and process safety management approach. Furthermore, it was identified 
that a gap exists in the monitoring, compliance, and auditing by the regulatory bodies. Data obtained from the 
Department of labor regarding occupational fatalities and injuries is insufficient and inconsistent. News reports 
were used to classify fatalities that were caused by explosions in the edible oil industries in the past decade.  
The results obtained have shed a light on the participant’s awareness, utilization, and consideration of prevention 
and mitigation approaches as well as the international best standards. It can be noted that a knowledge gap exists 






This study recommends that further research be carried out with a larger sample frame. Moreover, the survey 
questionnaire can include additional demographics questions regarding years of service or overall experience in 
industry and tertiary qualification discipline. This will allow us to compare the results based on years of service 
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I am a Master in (Engineering Management) student at the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment at 
the University of Johannesburg. As part of my studies, I am conducting a research project using a survey 
questionnaire that aims to verify the types of dust and gas explosion prevention approaches implemented in edible 
oil factories. Furthermore, the questionnaire seeks to validate the standards implemented at the edible oil factories 
for risk management.  I would like to request your participation in this survey. The research at hand seeks to 
investigate the effectiveness of installed prevention approaches in edible oil factories, such as active and passive 
engineered safety devices; procedural safety; process safety management, and the role of human culture within 
the workplace. The objective of this study will be to determine if a gap exists between South African standards 
and global standards. 
The recommendations from this research will allow for the identified gaps to be addressed through integrating 
internationally recognized explosion prevention approaches and standards with the South African local standards. 
Your contribution to the questionnaire will improve the accuracy and success of this research. Your response is 
vital and there are no answers considered as wrong or right. Participants are guaranteed that this survey is both 
confidential and anonymous. No information will be disclosed; regarding the company, the location, the health 
and safety representative; the safety manager, or the production engineer/manager. 
There is no need to enter any personal particulars on the questionnaire. Your participation is completely voluntary 















Please indicate your role in the company 
Please use a tick () next to your answer 
 
  Role in factory Please Tick 
appropriate box 
1 Site Engineer   
2 Production Manager   
3 Process / Safety Engineer   
4 Health & Safety Representative Officer   
 
 
Please indicate the availability of the following processes on your site 
Please use a tick () next to your answer 
 




1 Boilers   
2 Dry Silo storage & Crushing    
3 Solvent Extraction    
4 Refinery   




Please rate column A according to the level of awareness:  
 
1: Not at all aware, 2-Slightly aware, 3-Somewhat familiar, 4-Moderately aware, 5- Extremely aware 
 
Please rate column B according to the amount of use:  
 





What is your level of awareness 
regarding the dust and gas 
explosion prevention 
approaches? 
  Column B 
To what extent do you utilize 
the dust and gas explosion 


















































Principles related to dust and 











































 Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q1: Identifying hazards and unsafe 
conditions presented by raw 
materials; chemical solvents; by-
products and finished goods. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q2: Understanding the hazards; 
causes and effects and how they 
interact with the holistic site 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Inherent Safety Approach: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q3:Area classification -Zoning of 
Areas 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q4:Hazard Elimination - Avoiding 
hazard 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q5:Hazard Moderation- Reducing 
severity 
1 2 3 4 5 
Engineered Safety Approach: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q6:Passive Barriers - Usage of 
safeguards such as vapor walls; 
steel structure and double door 
system 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q7: Active Barriers - Usage of 
active systems such as .fixed 
detectors; mobile detectors; 
sprinkling system; ventilation 





What is your level of 
awareness regarding the dust 
and gas explosion prevention 
approaches 
  Column B 
To what extent do you utilize 
the dust and gas explosion 


















































Principles related to dust and 











































Procedural Safety Management: 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q9: Standard Operating 
Procedures 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q10: Developing Safe Maintenance 
Procedures 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Q11: Housekeeping Procedures 1 2 3 4 5 
Process Safety Management 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q12: Legal Liability  Compliance - 
Legal appointments of 
management personnel 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 Q13: Process Risk Management 1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q14: Process/ Equipment Integrity 
(Annual re-certification of pressure 
vessels) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Company Policies & Incident Management 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q15: Code of Conduct and 
Disciplinary Procedures 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q16: Company standards and  
Regulations 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q17: Goal setting and Human 
Factor Performance Monitoring 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q18: Training and Enhancing of 
Process Safety Knowledge 





Implementation and enforcement of recommended standards: 
Please rate below standard codes & scope according to the level of consideration:  Would not consider, 
might or might not consider, definitely consider. 
Please use a tick ()next to your answer. 










Standard for handling of combustible dusts    
AS/NZS 
3833:2007 
Standard for the storage and handling of mixed classes of 
dangerous goods. 
   
NFPA 654 Standard for the prevention of fire and dust explosions from 
the manufacturing, processing, and handling of combustible 
particulate solids 
   
SANS 10108 Standard for the classification of hazardous locations and 
the selection of apparatus for use in such locations 
   
NFPA 499 Standard for the classification of combustible dusts and of 
hazardous (classified) locations for electrical installations in 
chemical process areas 
   
IEC 60079-10-2 Standard  for explosive atmospheres Part 10–2: 
classification of areas—combustible dust atmospheres 
   
IEC 60079-0 Standard for explosive atmospheres—Part 0: equipment—
general requirements 
   
IEC 60079-1 Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 1: Equipment 
protection by flameproof enclosure. 
   
IEC 60079-2 Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 2: Equipment 
protection by pressurized enclosures  
   
IEC 60079-5 Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 5: Equipment 
protection by powder filling. 
   
IEC 60079-6 Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 6: Equipment 
protection by oil immersion. 
   
IEC 60079-7 Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 7: Equipment 
protection by increased safety. 
   
IEC 60079-11 Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 11: Equipment 
protection by intrinsic safety  
   
IEC 60079-15 Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 15: Equipment 
protection by various modes of sealing. 
   
IEC 60079-17 Standard for explosive atmospheres—Part 17: electrical 
installations inspection and maintenance 
   
IEC 60079-18 Standard  for explosive atmospheres – Part 18: Equipment 
protection by encapsulation. 






Standard for electrical equipment within explosive gas 
atmospheres—selection, installation and maintenance—
general requirements 
   
AS/NZS 
61241.10:2005 
Standard  for electrical apparatus for use in the presence of 
combustible dust—classification of areas where combustible 
dusts are or may be present 










APPENDIX C. Survey Responses 
Question 1: Please indicate your role in the company 
 
Professional role within the business 
Role in factory Responses 
Site Engineer 7 
Production Manager 2 
Process / Safety Engineer 4 





Question 2: Please indicate the availability of the following processes on your site 
 
Processing plants classifications 
Boilers 10 
Dry silo storage 5 
Solvent extraction 7 
Refinery 9 
Edible oil (by-products) 7 






















Q1: Identifying hazards and 
unsafe conditions presented by 
raw materials; chemical 
solvents; by-products and 
finished goods. 
0 1 3 8 5 17 
Q2: Understanding the hazards; 
causes and effects and how 
they interact with the holistic site 
system. 
0 2 3 8 4 17 
Q3: Area classification -Zoning 
of Areas 3 1 4 4 5 17 
Q4: Hazard Elimination - 
Avoiding hazard 1 3 4 4 5 17 
Q5: Hazard Moderation- 
Reducing severity 2 2 2 5 6 17 
Q6: Passive Barriers - Usage of 
safeguards such as: vapour 
walls; steel structure and double 
door system 
0 4 2 7 4 17 
Q7: Active Barriers - Usage of 
active systems such as: Fixed 
detectors; mobile detectors; 
sprinkling system; ventilation 
1 4 3 5 4 17 
Q8: Standard Operating 
Procedures 1 1 2 6 7 17 
Q9: Developing Safe 
Maintenance Procedures 0 2 3 4 8 17 
Q10: Housekeeping Procedures 2 1 1 3 10 17 
Q11: Legal Liability Compliance 
- Legal appointments of 
management personnel 
1 2 5 3 6 17 
Q12: Process Risk Management 1 3 4 4 5 17 
Q13: Process/ Equipment 
Integrity (Re-certification of 
pressure vessels) 
3 4 5 1 4 17 
Q14: Code of Conduct and 
Disciplinary Procedures 1 2 1 7 6 17 
Q15: Company standards and 
Regulations 0 1 2 8 6 17 
Q16: Goal setting and Human 
Performance Monitoring 1 2 3 6 5 17 
Q17: Training and Enhancing of 






Question 4: To what extent do you utilize the dust and gas explosion prevention principles and 
equipment? 










Q1: Identifying hazards and unsafe 
conditions presented by raw materials; 
chemical solvents; by-products and 
finished goods. 
1 1 7 3 5 17 
Q2: Understanding the hazards; causes 
and effects and how they interact with 
the holistic site system 
2 0 4 5 6 17 
Q3: Area classification -Zoning of Areas 
2 2 7 3 3 17 
Q4: Hazard Elimination - Avoiding 
hazard 1 1 6 3 6 17 
Q5: Hazard Moderation- Reducing 
severity 1 4 3 4 5 17 
Q6: Passive Barriers - Usage of 
safeguards such as: vapour walls; steel 
structure and double door system 
2 2 5 4 4 17 
Q7: Active Barriers - Usage of active 
systems such as: Fixed detectors; 
mobile detectors; sprinkling system; 
ventilation 
1 3 3 6 4 17 
Q8: Standard Operating Procedures 
1 0 3 5 8 17 
Q9: Developing Safe Maintenance 
Procedures 0 1 3 4 9 17 
Q10: Housekeeping Procedures 
1 1 4 1 10 17 
Q11: Legal Liability Compliance - Legal 
appointments of management 
personnel - Permit to Work 
0 1 5 1 10 17 
Q12: Process Risk Management 
1 3 2 4 7 17 
Q13: Process/ Equipment Integrity (Re-
certification of pressure vessels) 4 0 5 3 5 17 
Q14: Code of Conduct and Disciplinary 
Procedures 0 0 5 5 7 17 
Q15: Company standards and 
Regulations 0 1 3 3 10 17 
Q16: Goal setting and Human 
Performance Monitoring 2 2 2 7 4 17 
Q17: Training and Enhancing of 
















Q1: AS/NZS 4745:2004 - Standard for handling of combustible 
dusts 
1 5 11 17 
Q2: AS/NZS 3833:2007 - Standard for the storage and 
handling of mixed classes of dangerous goods. 
1 4 12 17 
Q3: NFPA 654 - Standard for the prevention of fire and dust 
explosions from the manufacturing, processing, and handling 
of combustible particulate solids 
0 4 13 17 
Q4: SANS 10108 - Standard for the classification of 
hazardous locations and the selection of apparatus for use in 
such locations 
2 4 11 17 
Q5: NFPA 499 - Standard for the classification of combustible 
dusts and of hazardous (classified) locations for electrical 
installations in chemical process areas 
0 5 12 17 
Q6: IEC 60079-10-2 - Standard  for explosive atmospheres 
Part 10–2: classification of areas—combustible dust 
atmospheres 
1 5 11 17 
Q7: IEC 60079-0 - Standard for explosive atmospheres—Part 
0: equipment—general requirements 
0 9 8 17 
Q8: IEC 60079-1 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 
1: Equipment protection by flameproof enclosure. 
0 3 14 17 
Q9: IEC 60079-2 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – Part 
2: Equipment protection by pressurized enclosures  
1 6 10 17 
Q10: IEC 60079-5 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 5: Equipment protection by powder filling. 
0 8 9 17 
Q11: IEC 60079-6 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 6: Equipment protection by oil immersion. 
1 8 8 17 
Q12: IEC 60079-7 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 7: Equipment protection by increased safety. 
1 6 10 17 
Q13: IEC 60079-11 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 11: Equipment protection by intrinsic safety  
2 3 12 17 
Q14: IEC 60079-15 - Standard for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 15: Equipment protection by various modes of sealing. 
0 8 9 17 
Q15: IEC 60079-17 - Standard for explosive atmospheres—
Part 17: electrical installations inspection and maintenance 
1 5 11 17 
Q16: IEC 60079-18 - Standard  for explosive atmospheres – 
Part 18: Equipment protection by encapsulation. 
1 7 9 17 
Q17: AS/NZS 2381.1:2005 - Standard for electrical equipment 
within explosive gas atmospheres—selection, installation and 
maintenance—general requirements 
1 7 9 17 
Q18: AS/NZS 61241.10:2005 - Standard for electrical 
apparatus for use in the presence of combustible dust—
classification of areas where combustible dusts are or may be 
present 
1 8 8 17 
Q19: AS/NZS 1020:1995 /SANS 10123 - Standard for the 
control of undesirable static electricity 
1 8 8 17 
 
